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COMMENTS
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS: CONSUMER VERSUS
FINANCIER IN CONSUMER GOODS FINANCING-
A JUDICIAL DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
The underlying philosophy of negotiable instruments law has been
to encourage the free transferability of commercial paper. Pursuant to
this policy, the concept of holder in due course was formulated to enable
a transferee qualifying as a holder' to purchase a negotiable instrument
free from all claims and defenses to the instrument, except certain prior-
ity defenses termed "real defenses." 2 This concept is analogous to the
bona fide purchaser for value principle of property law, in that both
concepts seek to protect the good faith purchaser by rendering impotent
certain outstanding equities to the instrument purchased. Therefore the
term holder in due course stands for the concept of encouraging the
"free negotiability of commercial paper by removing certain anxieties
of one who takes the paper as an innocent purchaser."3
The holder in due course concept has found favor among financial
institutions in view of the fact that it enables a financier to purchase
negotiable promissory notes emanating from consumer sales practically
risk-free, because the notes can be enforced against the makers irrespec-
tive of defenses arising out of the underlying transaction. In a very real
sense the ordinary installment credit sale is a tripartite transaction in
that the consumer purchasing a chattel on installments simultaneously
executes a promissory note and security agreement to the retailer. This
retailer, usually in accordance with a pre-arranged financing plan, as-
signs the contract and endorses the note immediately following their
execution to a third party financial institution for value, by a process
called discounting, thus completing the three pronged transaction. In
reality these consumer financing transactions are a sham in the sense
that:
[t]he transaction is really a loan by the financier to the buyer
to enable him to buy a chattel from the seller. However, the
papers are arranged in such a way that the loan is stated to be
from seller to buyer, and the resulting debt is then said to be
transferred to the financier. The transaction is not, in other
words, what it appears to be.4
Under this form of arrangement, if the chattel purchased by the
consumer is defective or never delivered, the unwary buyer will generally
'See UNIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(20) (1962 Official Text); NEGOnABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW § 191.2 See UmIo~mR COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305 (1962 Official Text); NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAW § 57.
3 Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J., 1967) see note 74, infra.4 Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Cozurse of Consumer Paper,
1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 177, 183.
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discontinue payments on the assumption that his obligation to pay the
note terminated due to the failure of consideration.5 On the other hand.
the finance company has purchased the promissory note under the belief
that it could enforce the instrument as a holder in due course, notwith-
standing a subsequent failure of consideration or other defense arising
out of the original sales transaction. In the ensuing litigation, the pri-
mary question before the court is which of these two "innocents," the
consumer-maker or the financier-holder, should be shackled with the
risk of the loss. In attempting to resolve this issue, the judiciary has
endeavored to strike a balance between the following two conflicting
policy considerations: . . . "the desire on the one hand to protect the
conditional vendee from abusive practices and the necessity on the other
hand of preserving the free negotiability of commercial paper.'"6
Generally the courts have favored the policy promoting the free flow
of credit, and have upheld the general law of negotiable instruments. 7
As a result, the consumer is held liable on his promissory note or con-
tract" to a finance company that purchased the note free from personal
defenses as a holder in due course. Usually in this situation the consumer
will ultimately bear the loss because his only recourse is against the
retail dealer, who in a majority of cases has absconded or declared
bankruptcy. The law of negotiable instruments does, however, protect
the consumer to the extent that once he has established a defense to the
instrument in question, then the holder has the full "burden of estab-
lishing that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects a
holder in due course." 9 The term "in all respects" means that the holder
must sustain this burden by affirmatively establishing that the instrument
in question was taken (1) for value, (2) in good faith, and (3) without
notice of any defenses or claims to it.1' These last two requisites have
become areas of considerable controversy in their application to con-
sumer credit transactions. More specifically, the latter controversy
centers around the issue whether or not the credit arrangements between
a financial institution and a retail dealer concerning the financing of
5 The ordinary relationship between the consumer and the financier in these
cases must be distinguished from that relationship resulting from a direct
lending of money by the financier to the consumer, which is completely de-
tached from the actual sale. The latter case does not present any questions
concerning negotiability.
6 Griffin v. Baltimore Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 204 Md. 154, 159, 102 A.2d
804, 806 (1954).
7 See 11 AM. JUR. Bills and Notes § 425, 431 (1965).
8 See BaTTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 15 at 40 (2d ed. 1961) which states: "The
great majority of cases hold that a negotiable note secured by the mortgage
imparts the quality of negotiability to the mortgage. Under this rule an as-
signee of the mortgage, who is also an endorsee of the note for value, before
maturity and in good faith, takes the mortgage just as he takes the note
free from defenses."
9 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-307 (1962 Official Text) ; NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUMIENTS LAW § 59.
10 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-307, Comment 3 (1962 Official Text).
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consumer goods transactions are sufficient in themselves to preclude the
financier from attainment of holder in due course status.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD
The controversy concerning the issue of what constitutes a purchaser
in good faith dates back to common law. In the early case of Lawson v.
Weston,' Lord Kenyon expressed concern over the paralyzing effect
that a constructive notice standard would have on the circulation of
commercial paper. Nevertheless, in 1824, the Court of Kings Bench in
Gill v. Cubitt'2 held that a purchaser of a negotiable instrument must
exercise reasonableness and prudence, and that, if the circumstances
are such as "ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent and careful
man" and no inquiry was made, then he could not take the instrument
as a holder in due course.' 3 Consequently, under this rule, suspicious
circumstances alone would let in outstanding equities and defenses
against the third party purchaser. Realizing the deterrent effect on com-
mercial paper that would ensue from a strict adherence to the "suspicious
circumstances" test, the English court abandoned it entirely in Goodman
v. Harvey.'4 In the Goodman case the court held that nothing short of
actual bad faith could prevent the holder from taking in due course; and
that circumstances establishing gross negligence on the part of the pur-
chaser might be evidence of mala fides, but were not conclusive of it."
The courts in the United States were split as to which of the common
law doctrines was appropriate.' 6 Some jurisdictions sided with the Gill
v. Cubitt "suspicious circumstances"' 7 test while others favored the
actual bad faith test as enunciated in Goodman v. Harvey.'- It was
amidst this confusion that the Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.)
was promulgated. It is evident from Section 56 of the N.I.L.." which
defines notice as either actual knowledge or knowledge of such facts,
that the taking of the instrument "amounted to bad faith," that the
drafters intended to bring about harmony to this area by incorporating
"1170 Eng. Rep. 640 (Eng. 1801).
12 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824) ; In its opinion the court disparaged Lawson v. Wes-
ton by alluding to several recent robberies and suggesting that such a rule
enables a thief to readily dispose of stolen paper.
13 Ibid.
14 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836).
1 Ibid. The court's reference to gross negligence was due to Crook v. Jadis, 110
Eng. Rep. 1028 (1834) which diluted the prudent man test of Gill v. Cubitt
to a rule that nothing short of gross negligence could defeat holder in due
course statu..
16 For a discussion of the historical development of the "good faith" standard
see Rightmire, The Doctrine of Bad Faith in the Law of Negotiable Instru-
ments, 18 MIcH. L. Rav. 355 (1920).
17See Roth v. Calvin, 32 Vt. 125 (1859) ; Mee v. Carlson, 22 S.D. 365, 117 N.W.
1033 (1908) ; require that the purchaser use means that a prudent man would
utilize to ascertain the manner in which the instrument was executed.
28 See Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. 343 (1857); BlurroN, supra note 8 § 100,
at 246 n.14.
11 N(O"rIASLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 56.
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the Goodman v. Harvey standard into the uniform law. Subsequent de-
cisions interpreting this section conclusively establish that the "suspicious
circumstance" test was abolished by the N.I.L. and replaced by one
requiring actual knowledge or dishonesty in fact.20
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) defines good faith as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."2 1 However,
until 1957, the good faith standard under article three of the Code
contained the additional requisite of observing reasonable commercial
standards of the holder's trade or business, which seemingly injected
an objective element into the test.22 However, this reasonable commercial
standards requirement was deleted from article three in the 1957 edition.
This omission clearly manifested that any vestiges of the "suspicious
circumstance" test, as exemplified in Gill v. Cubitt, was totally eradicated
from that article of the Code.23
The Code defines notice as actual knowledge or "reason to know"
from all the facts at the time of transfer.24 It is submitted that the phrase
"reason to know" embraces nothing beyond the realm of "wilful negli-
gence" as exemplified by a situation where the purchaser shuts his eyes
to the surrounding circumstances, when such circumstances are "so
cogent and obvious that to remain passive would constitute bad faith. ' 2
In conformity with this historical development of the traditional
good faith standard, a majority of American jurisdictions have held:
. . . the true test is the presence or absence of bad faith, and not
diligence or negligence or the presence of suspicious circum-
stances. Negligence in failing to make inquiry in the face of
suspicious circumstances, or even gross negligence is not conclu-
sive and does not establish bad faith as a matter of law, but it
is evidence of bad faith and material as bearing on the question
of bad faith.26
20 Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201, 224 (1952)
where the court held that: "Bad faith, i.e. fraud, not merely suspicious circum-
stances, must be brought home to a holder for value whose rights accrued
before maturity, in order to defeat his recovery on a negotiable note upon
the ground of fraud in its inception or between the parties to it." See also 11
AM. JUR. Bills and Notes § 435 (1963).
21 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(19) (1962 Official Text).
22 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(1) (b) (1952 edition) read: " (b)
in good faith including observance of the reasonable commercial standards of
any business in which the holder may be engaged. .. ."2sSee 1956 Recommendations for the Uniform Commercial Code issued by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissions of
Uniform State Law § 3-302 stating: "The change, made by Supplement No.
1, consists of striking out the reference to reasonable commercial standards.
The omission is intended to make clear that the doctrine of an objective stand-
ard of good faith, exemplified by the case of Gill v. Cubitt ... is not intended
to be incorporated in Article 3."
24 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(25) (1962 Official Text).
25 For discussion of "Wilful Ignorance" see 11 Am. JUR. Bills and Notes § 433
(1963).
2610 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 324 at 820 (1938).
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In light of the difficult burden of establishing that a financier in fact
took the instrument with knowledge of a fraud perpetrated or a defense
arising out of the underlying sales transaction, the financier usually pre-
vails under the traditional standard. In fact, when the financier is aware
of some unscrupulous business tactics by the dealer in the past, the tra-
ditional standard does not necessarily impose upon the financier a duty
to investigate the "bona fides" of the underlying sale between the dealer
and maker because such knowledge amounts to nothing more than "sus-
picious circumstances." Recently in Westfield Investment Co. v. Fel-
lers,27 the New Jersey court leveled a direct attack at this proposition.
There the court stated that when the finance company furnishes forms
to a retailer containing therein a printed assignment to that company, in
reality it is exercising a choice which cannot be made in utter disregard
of the buying public's interest and therefore: "[flf it has chosen care-
lessly or has noticed the employment of doubtful business ethics, the
financing company should not be allowed to hide behind the holder in
due course cloak and thumb its nose at the consumer public."'
Such a standard is clearly a revival of the Gill v. Cubitt "suspicious
circumstance" test. However direct attacks on the good faith standard
are infrequent due to the unwillingness of the courts to chance a dis-
turbance of the traditional rule in dealings between merchants, especi-
ally since there are other means available to avoid the harsh effect of
this rule upon the consumer.
III. "CLOSE CONNECTION" RATIONALE
Several jurisdictions, recognizing the inadequacy of the traditonal
rule from the consumer's standpoint, have tailor-made their own theories
designed to circumvent the harsh effect 9 of the traditional standard
on the consumer. These theories have generally been directed toward the
situation where the financier is found to be closely connected with the
consumer sale. These "close connection" theories find support in the
rationale that the more the holder knows about the underlying trans-
action and the closer it is connected to the source of the instrument,
"the less need there is for giving [it] tension-free rights considered
necessary in a fast-moving, credit-extending commercial world.130
27 181 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super. 1962). In this case the financier purchased the
note without an inquiry into the known prevailing situation to determine
the reason for some 300 to 500 repossessions in similar freezer transactions
by a single constable in the same vicinity where the financier and retailer
were located.28 Id. at 817.29 See New Jersey Mortgage and Investment Co. v. Calvetti, 68 N.J. Super. 18,
171 A.2d 321 (1961), where the consumer fell victim to a house siding
scheme and the court held that in order for the finance company to be charged
with taking with notice, there must be evidence showing actual knowledge of
a defense or claim. The court said that past dealings between the dealer and
financier are irrelevant to the issue of notice.30 Unico v. Owens, 232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967). For a discussion of a significant
non-legal element present in the consumer goods cases see Gilmore, The Corn-
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The groundwork for numerous decisions denying holder in due
course status to financial institutions because of their intimate relation-
ship with the underlying sales transaction was laid in Taylor v. Atlas
Security Co.3 1 In Taylor the court clearly indicated that it would not
permit the financier to immunize itself from defenses where the purpose
of the financier-dealer relationship is to strip the consumer of his other-
wise valid defenses. In this case, the financier knew the automobile sold
to the consumer was worth less than the sale price; and further there
was a close dealer-financier association demonstrated by the following
facts: (1) the retailer used blank forms supplied by the financier, (2)
the finance company was named as payee in the promissory note exe-
cuted by the consumer, (3) the finance company had a standing arrange-
ment to purchase all of the dealer's automobile credit paper, (4) the
retailer collected the consumer's payments subsequent to the transfer
of the note and chattel mortgage to the financier, and (5) the instru-
ments were discounted to the financier immediately following their
execution. Upon these facts the Missouri court held that while the in-
cidents of this arrangement, considered individually, would not defeat
holder in due course status, when viewed as a whole they breed a strong
inference that the financier had actual knowledge of the fraud perpe-
trated by the retailer.3 2 Notwithstanding the application of this inference
of knowledge to a rather extreme and limited factual situation, the court
appeared to have sowed the seed for a new species of attack upon the
financier-dealer relationship.
This refusal to permit a finance company having a "close connection"
with the underlying sale "to isolate itself behind the fictional fence of
the law-merchant"3 3 has been accomplished by the courts through the
utilization of the following rationales:(1) financier as an original party
to the underlying sale, (2) agency relationship, and (3) viewing the
promissory note as a carrier with luggage. Notwithstanding the classifi-
cation of these rationales under three distinct headings, the only real
distinction concerning their applicability to a given factual situation is a
judicial determination, made without any explicit pre-set formula, as
to which rationale appeals to the court. As a result, it should be remem-
mercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchaser, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1098 (1954)
where that author stated: "[I]t is hard, and it becomes each year harder, for
counsel to explain convincingly why 'the law' requires that a hard-pressed
wage-earner who has been bilked by a now-insolvent seller into buying junk
masquerading as a television set or a washing machine must pay the full
price to a bank or finance company whose own relationship with the fraudu-
lent seller has been intimate, long-continued, and profitable."
31249 S.W. 746 (Mo. App. 1923).
32 Id. at 748. See also Davis v. Commercial Credit, 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d
710 (1950) where "close connection" theory was utilized where the court
found evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the finance company engaged
in a conspiracy with the dealer to defraud the consumer-vendee.
33 Buffalo Industrial Bank v. DeMarzio, 162 Misc. 742, 744, 296 N.Y.S. 783, 786
(City Ct. Buffalo 1937) rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (S.Ct. 1937).
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bered that we are dealing with one basic "close connection" theory that
has been construed into three different forms.
A. ORIGINAL PARTY TO THE TRANSAcrIoN
The requisite degree of closeness for invoking the inference of
knowledge in the Taylor case was diminished by the landmark case of
Commercial Credit v. Childs.34 In that case an automobile retailer fi-
nanced his sales pursuant to a prearranged discounting procedure with
the finance company. In order to facilitate the lending procedure, the
finance company furnished the dealer with printed sales contracts and
notes containing a written assignment therein to itself. The actual trans-
fer of these instruments to the financier took place immediately subse-
quent to their execution by the consumer. Knowledge of questionable
practices by the retailer similar to that found in the Taylor facts was
not present in the Childs case.35 Under these facts the court stated:
[the finance company) was so closely connected with the entire
transaction or with the deal, that it cannot be heard to say that
it, in good faith, was an innocent purchaser of the instrument for
value .... Rather than being a purchaser of the instrument after
its execution it was to all intents and purposes a party to the
agreement and instrument from the beginning. 36
This language indicates that the court was relying solely upon the
credit arrangements between the financier and the dealer to sustain its
finding that the financier "to all intents and purposes" was a de facto
party to the original sales transaction. By adopting this rationale, the
court could legally impute the retailer's fraudulent knowledge to the
financier thus precluding the latter from purchasing the negotiable con-
sumer paper as a holder in due course. Prior to the Childs decision, the
New York court employed a similar line of reasoning in Buffalo Indus-
trial Bank v. DeMarzio37 by expressly recognizing the fact that finance
companies are in reality an essential ingredient of the retailer's business,
in that they exclusively control the management of credit arrangements
and collection of accounts for these retailers. As a result of these ar-
rangements, the court felt that the prevailing sense of justice required
the finding of a "factual joint enterprise" existing between the finan-
cier and dealer and "[t]o pretend that they are separate and distinct
enterprises is to draw the veil of fiction over the face of fact."38 Stated
more succinctly, a financier who is found to be closely associated with
the retailer's consumer sales will be considered a de facto party to the
consumer transaction, and consequently the financier will be unable to
34199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
35 For a discussion of the factual variances between the Taylor and Childs' cases
see Note, 28 NoRE DAME LAW. 251, 252 (1953).36 137 S.W.2d 260, 262.
ar162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y. Supp. 783 (City Ct. Buffalo 1937), rev'd on other
grounds, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (S.Ct. 1937).38 Id. at 745, 296 N.Y.S. at 786.
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subsequently purchase the instrument emanating from that transaction
in due course.
In spite of the clear enunciation of the "original party" theory in
Childs, the ratio decidendi gave forth the following contradictory state-
ment: "Under the facts detailed above we think it was [the financier's]
duty before taking an assignment of the instrument to inquire whether
[the consumer's] signature thereto had been obtained through fraud
and misrepresentation."3 9
By so stating, the court indicated that it was imposing a "duty to
inquire into the bona-fides of the original sale" 40 upon the financier
when its relationship to the consumer sales transaction becomes as in-
timate as that present in the Childs case. Such a standard is the equiva-
lent of making this close financier-dealer relationship a suspicious
circumstance necessitating an inquiry pursuant to the Gill v. Cubitt
rule,4' which we have seen was repudiated and replaced by the tradi-
tional standard. By disregarding the existing law, the court is no longer
merely circumventing the effect of that law, but it is legislating its own
standards to replace it. This approach is similar to that found in the
Westfield case,42 where the court leveled a direct attack on the traditional
rule. Furthermore, it is difficult to comprehend what prompted the court
to disregard the inherent polarity existing between the "original party"
theory and one directly attacking the traditional test by imposing a
duty to investigate upon the transferee. The court mentions both of
these rationales in the same breath, but fails to distinguish them as the
separate and distinct principles that they are. Since the "original party"
theory legally imputes knowledge to the financier as a de facto party
to the sales transaction, it is irreconcilable in toto to then impose a
duty to inquire on the financier as a third party purchaser of the con-
sumer paper, under the assumption that the financier was unrelated to
the underlying transaction. While the purpose of the court to shift the
risk of loss to the financier when it acts as an ostensible party to the
consumer sale was clearly manifested, it was unfortunate that the court
did not employ the same clarity in reaching that end. Decisions in the
aftermath of the Childs case illustrate that the confusion emanating
therefrom is far from eliminated. 43
Several years following the Childs decision the same Arkansas court
in Public Loan Corporation of Little Rock v. Terrell,44 limited the ap-
plication of the "original party" theory by holding that the mere furnish-
39 137 S.W.2d 260, 262.
40See 53 HARV. L. Rv. 1200 (1940).
41 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824).
42 181 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super. 1962).
43See Public Loan of Little Rock v. Terrell, 275 S.W.2d 435 (Ark. 1955) ; Davis
v. Commercial Credit Corp., 249 S.W. 746 (Mo. App. 1923); Westfield Invest-
ment Co. v. Fellers, 181 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super. 1962).
44275 S.W.2d 435 (Ark., 1955).
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ing of forms to the retailer not bearing the financier's name, and the
prompt endorsement of the note to the financier after its execution,
did not by itself substantiate a finding of "bad faith" or "that [the fi-
nance company] was to all intents and purposes a party to the trans-
action between [the dealer and consumer]."' 5 The courts' reference to
these theories in the alternative appears to be an attempt to clarify the
Childs confusion, notwithstanding the courts' failure to either mention
or cite the Childs case in the opinion. On the basis of the Terrell deci-
sion one might speculate that the financier is on safe ground if he merely
supplies forms containing blank assignment provisions which may be
filled in after the sale is consumated and the note and the contract
executed. In fact the Citizen and Southern National Bank v. Stepp46
decision held that when the financier's name does not appear in the
formal content of the note or contract, but only on the edge for adver-
tising purposes, this does dot in itself establish the financier as a par-
ticipant in the original sales transaction; because the finance company
in that instance was not obligated to, and in fact did not, purchase all
of the retailer's consumer paper. However Stepp seems to also indicate
in a negative manner that, where there is an understanding to purchase
all the dealer's paper, then, even though the financier is not named as
assignee on the note and contract, he may be considered a party to a
consumer sale.
In Commercial Credit Corporation v. Orange County Machine
Works47 the California court utilized the "original party" theory to pro-
tect the defenses of the commercial vendee. In that case Commercial
Credit not only supplied forms designating itself as assignee, but it also
consulted with the vendor concerning the financing of an impending
sale of machinery. Pursuant to an arrangement arising out of these
consultations, Commercial Credit advanced money to the vendor in re-
turn for an immediate assignment and negotiation of the contract and
note. The vendor subsequently became insolvent and failed to procure
and deliver the machine to the vendee. In an action by Commercial
Credit to enforce the note, the court's ratio decidendi resolved two sig-
nificant issues: (1) whether or not the physical attachment of the note
to the contract by a perforated line destroyed the negotiability of the
note, and (2) whether a financier which aids and counsels the vendor
concerning the underlying sale, can procure the note therefrom as a
holder in due course. On the first issue the court held that physical
attachment of the two instruments at the time of transfer would not
itself defeat the negotiability of the note. As to the second, the court
found that such active participation by the financier in the underlying
sales transaction barred subsequent holder in due course status since
45 Id. at 436.
4" 126 F. Supp. 744 (D.C. Fla. 1954).
47 214 P2d 819 (Cal. 1950); discussed in Note, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 580 (1950).
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"[ijn a very real sense the finance company was a moving force in the
transaction from its very inception, and acted as a party to it. ' ' 48 While
it is obvious that the outcome in each of the "close connection" cases
depends almost entirely upon the specific factual situation, when such
facts evidence an active participation by the financier in the underlying
sales transaction, the Orange County Machine Works rationale may
operate to deny the protected status of holder in due course to the
financier.
49
While the factual situation in the Orange County Machine Works
case clearly qualifies under the literal definition of the "original party"
theory, it is doubtful whether the Childs decision was ever intended to
be extended beyond the realm of protecting the unwary household con-
sumer, and into commercial transactions between merchants. However,
due to the absence of an explicit definition restricting the applicability
of the theory, the court has invited such far reaching application of this
theory.
In Mutual Finance Company v. Martin,50 the Childs "original party"
theory was reiterated and found applicable by the Florida court, not-
withstanding the finance company's contention that to deny holder in
due course status to a financier under facts similar to those in the Childs
case would seriously effect the modus operandi of business in that state.
In response to this argument the court stated:
It may be that our holding here will require some changes in
business methods and will impose a greater burden on the finance
companies. We think the buyer-Mr. and Mrs. General Public-
should have some protection somewhere along the line. We be-
lieve the finance company is better able to bear the risk of the
dealer's insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position
to protect his interests against unscrupulous and insolvent deal-
ers.5'
This position by the court is an explicit repudiation of the funda-
mental policy of negotiable instruments law, which strives for the free
flow of credit; and the substitution of a policy favoring the preservation
of consumer defenses at the expense of slowing somewhat the "wheels"
of commerce."
There are certain dangers lurking in the shadows of the Martin
decision. The court's reliance upon the indefinite term, "Mr. and Mrs.
General Public," to delineate the persons encompassed within the rule
could lead to the misapplication of this rule in the area of commercial
transactions between merchants. The Orange County Machine Work.S2
case demonstrates how a rule which was originated for the purpose of
43 d. at 822.
49See 20 U. CIN. L. Rsv. 123 (1951).
50 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
,IId. at 653.
52 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824).
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protecting the household consumers, because of their unequal bargaining
position, can be stretched to include the experienced merchant. The
possibility of such misapplication, however, appears to be the price that
must be paid when the court decides to don both a judicial and a legis-
lative hat. Another matter of grave concern to the financing business
is the possibility of the court's utilizing the "original party" theory,
not merely to defeat holder in due course status, but to hold the finan-
cier liable for the dealer's breach of contract or, even more traumatic,
liable for a breach of express or implied warranty. In this light, the
"original party" theory stands as a possible deathblow to the free
transferability of credit paper, which presently is the backbone of modern
business practices.
In last analysis, it can be said that the modern day "original party"
doctrine is a far different creature than that applied originally by the
court in the Taylor case. There need be no showing of inala fides, but
only evidence establishing the financier's close connection with the
underlying sales transaction, in order to impute knowledge'to it as a
party to that transaction. The standard so stated attempts to meet the
original purpose of the "close connection" rationale, the protection of
the consumer from unscrupulous practices by the retailer, by nullifying
the effect of financing arrangements. Can it honestly be said that this
is a reasonable means of obtaining that end, or is it merely shifting the
problem to a new setting?
B. AGENCY RELATIONSHIP
Some jurisdictions have attempted to equalize the superior economic
advantage of the financier over the consumer by imputing the knowledge
of the retailer to the financier through a principal-agent relationship.
Actually the only distinction existing between several of these agency
cases and those adopting the "original party" theory, is the legal rationale
utilized by the court, since the result and determinative factors are simi-
lar in both lines of cases. The Childs decision is accorded substantial
weight by both. 53 A typical example of this type of agency case is
Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp.,54 where in addition to the normal
activities establishing a close association between the financier and
dealer, the note was made payable at the financier's office and the vendor
assumed the obligation of repurchasing the auto from the endorsee in
the event of the vendee's default in payment. Under these facts the court
held that the financier was the dealer's agent for collection of the note
and that it possessed and demanded payment of it in that capacity. In
addition, several courts have relied upon agency principles when the
dealer was found to be, in fact, a field or sales agent of the endorsee. 55
5 3 See Note 33 N.C. L. Rzv. 608, 610-611 (1955).
54 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
55 Bastian-Blessing Co. v. Stroope, 203 Ark. 116, 155 S.W.2d 892 (1941), where
the dealer was the sales agent of the endorsee; International Harvester Co.
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In the latter cases there is little doubt that agency principles were prop-
erly applied. However, under the former cases, the same problem innate
in the "original party" theory is again encountered. It is questionable
whether the agency rationale is any more adept than the "original party
rationale" at coping with the issue as to which financiers in all justice
deserve to be insulated from consumer defenses and those that do not.
C. PROMISSORY NOTE AS A CARRIER WITH LUGGAGE
Notwithstanding the rule that the negotiable characteristics of a
promissory note are imparted to a security agreement which secures its
payment, it is generally recognized that merely because a "title security
note" manifests on its face that it was executed pursuant to a security
agreement does not imply a condition that the note will not be paid until
the security agreement is fully performed. 6 It is further recognized
that mere notice of the executory nature of a note, absent notice of any
defaults, does not prevent the holder from purchasing in due course.5"
However, some jurisdictions have held that when a contract and
promissory note are transferred simultaneously to the same party prior
to the passing of consideration, the transferee takes the note with notice
of its conditional liability, thus precluding it from taking in due
course.5 8 A recent decision adopting this rationale is International Fi-
nance Corp. v. Rieger.5 9 There the finance company furnished the re-
tailer with forms designating itself as assignee, and instructed the retailer
on the procedures for completion of these forms to the financier's satis-
faction. The financier made special mention to the retailer of its policy
requiring a "satisfaction installation certificate" signed by the vendee
before it would purchase the note and contract emanating from the con-
sumer sale. The findings disclosed that the dealer forged the vendee's
signature on the required certificate and subsequently defaulted on the
sales contract. The Minnesota Supreme Court sustained the lower court
in denying holder in due course status to the financier by stating:
where a note has been executed concurrently with a conditional
sales contract for the sale of equipment to be installed to the
buyers satisfaction . . . an assignee of the note and conditional
sales contract, who has participated in the transaction from its
origin so as to have acquired knowledge of the conditional liability
v. Carruth, 23 So. 2d 473 (La. 1945), where the vendor was a field agent of
the endorsee; United States v. Schaeffer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1940),
where the finance company was a subsidiary of the endorser.56 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3-105 (1962 Official Text); Also UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 3-105, Comment 4 (1962 Official Text) which states that
3-105(1)(e) "rejects cases which have held that the mere statement that
the instrument is secured, by reservation of title or otherwise, carries the im-
plied condition that payment is to be made only if the security agreement is
fully performed .... The provision adopts the position of the great majority
of the courts."
57 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3-304(4) (b) (1962 Official Text).58 See First and Lumbermans Nat'l Bank v. Bucholz, 220 Minn. 97, 102, 18 N.W.2d
771, 774 (1945).
5 137 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 1965).
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of the purchaser or maker of the note, does not become a holder
of the note in due course. 60
A somewhat similar rationale was employed in Local Acceptance
Company z. Kinkade,61 where the financier purchased a note and chattel
mortgage knowing that a "sew" agreement had also been executed under
which the seller would furnish the consumer pre-cut garments for
twenty-four months (the length of the note) except for months when
cash payments were made; also that the consumer would be paid $15
per month for the sewed garments, the amount of the monthly payments
due on the note. The Supreme Court of Missouri sustained a jury in-
struction which essentially stated that if the consumer performed the
"sew agreement so far as possible," but the seller breached it by a fail-
ure to pay the amount due therefrom then the consumer had not been
guilty of a breach by failing to pay further installments and if the finan-
cier had knowledge of the "sew agreement" prior to receiving the in-
struments, "then [financier] stands in the same position as [the seller]
and cannot recover.) 62
It is evident on the face of these aforementioned cases that the theory
of the judiciary was just another formulation to preserve the defenses
available to the vendee emanating from the underlying sale, in order to
equalize the superior bargaining power of the financier. More specific-
ally, these courts are utilizing the "dose connection" existing between
the financier and the retailer to establish "by necessary implication" that
the note is subject to the terms and conditions of the accompanying in-
stallment sales contract. Therefore, this approach will view a note and
contract executed concurrently as an "entire contract" 63 under the ra-
tionale that if a financier purchasing the contract is entitled to reap its
benefits, then it would be a "perversion of justice" not to likewise bur-
den him with the contract's obligation. It is doubtful whether such an
implied dependency of performance, commonly found in bilateral con-
tracts, was intended to creep into the law of negotiable instruments,
especially in light of the Uniform Commercial Code's seemingly negative
attitude on the point.6 4
IV. REPUDIATIoN OF THE "CLOsE CONNECTION" RATIONALE
The position enunciated in the "close connection" cases has met with
stiff opposition in several jurisdictions, which favor the policy under-
6o Id. at 177.
61361 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1962).
62 Id. at 835.
03 This theory appeared in Local Acceptance Co. v. Kinkade, Id. at 833, where
the court stated: "It has often been held that a contemporaneous written con-
tract, entered into between the original parties to a note, and connected with
the note by direct reference or by necessary implication may effect the payee's
right to recover against the maker, and that the two instruments should be
considered together as the entire contract."6 4 See UNIFoRm CommAciAL CODE 3-105 (1962 Official Text).
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lying the law of negotiable instruments and the "fostering [of] prompt
service in mercantile transactions. ' 65 In White Systems of New Orleans
v. Hall,66 the court acknowledged that there is some justification for the
judiciary's anxiety concerning the financier's use of the negotiable in-
struments law to acquire an unfair advantage over the consumer, but
that the steps to remedy this practice should be taken by the legislature
and not the judiciary." The most exhaustive criticism of the "close
connection" theory can be found in Implement Credit Corp. v. El-
singer.68 This case presents a somewhat different factual situation than
that found in the ordinary consumer goods cases in that, here the maker,
Elsinger, was an automobile dealer who sought to borrow some money
from Bierman, a partner in an implement dealership. When Bierman
advanced the money to Elsinger, he induced Elsinger to sign some pa-
pers, the substance of which was not made known to the borrower. The
papers were in fact a note and sales contract to the implement dealership,
and were subsequently discounted to Implement Credit Co., a financing
agency set up by the Wisconsin implement dealers to finance their sales.
The financier supplied these dealers with forms containing pre-printed
assignments to itself. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that evidence
merely disclosing financier-furnished forms, and that the financier
purchased paper only from these furnished dealers, does not, without
additional facts establishing an actual participation by the financier in
the original transaction prevent it from purchasing as a holder in
due course. The underlying reason for this conclusion was the court's
recognition that the furnishing of pre-printed forms is essentially a
means of facilitating the financing procedure, by obviating delays neces-
sitated by the financier's hesitation to purchase instruments containing
unfamiliar content. Accordingly, these practices fostered, rather than
impeded, the free flow of credit, which is clearly in line with the public's
best interests.69 Upon this foundation the court concluded:
We can perceive of no reason based upon either logic or public
policy why a finance company or bank which supplies such blank
forms should be held thereby to have constituted the dealer their
agents, or should be deemed to have participated in the sale by
the dealer to the consumer, including the execution of any con-
65 181 A.2d 809, 817 (N.J. Super. 1962).
66219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
67A similar position was expressed in Note, 26 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 435, 438 (1953).
68 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657, rehearing denied 67 N.W.2d 873 (1955).
69 Cf. 39 MINN. L. REv. 775, 778 (1955) which expressed the following view:
"Certainly it is indispensable to our economy to maintain the free flow of credit
promoted by allowing a good faith purchaser of negotiable paper to hold it
free of defenses against a prior holder. However, the dealer's superior know-
ledge of legal rights and his superiority in bargaining power over the con-
sumer, who because he intends the goods for his personal use and not for
resale does not consider this a commercial transaction, suggest that commercial
practice should not govern consumer installment transactions."
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tract, mortgage, or note which the customer may have executed
to the dealer.70
The policy espoused in Elsinger has been adhered to in several re-
cent decisions. In Swanson v. Fuline Corp.,7 1 the United States District
Court in Oregon held that, in the absence of evidence establishing actual
or direct participation by the financier in the consumer sale, the mere
showing that the financier (1) made a commitment prior to consumma-
tion of the sale to purchase the note and contract emanating therefrom,
(2) furnished forms to the dealer, and (3) reviewed the consumer's
financial integrity, all in the regular course of business as a financier,
does not evince a lack of "good faith."
In James Talcott, Inc. v. Schulman,7 2 the New Jersey court reiterated
the Elsinger holding, and stated that where the financier enters into a
discounting arrangement; and, pursuant thereto, it furnishes notes and
contracts bearing that financier's name to the retailer, such conduct does
not by itself demonstrate a lack of "good faith."
The essential difference between these cases and the "close connec-
tion" cases can be boiled down to a disagreement "as to where the bal-
ance should be struck between the policy favoring consumer protection
on the one hand, and the policy fostering prompt service in the mercan-
tile transactions on the other. ' '7 3 It would appear that somewhere be-
tween these two terminals of thought there is a median that can
uniformly give the consumer adequate protection without seriously
impeding the free flow of credit and the "wheels of commerce."
V. UNIco v. OwENs
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court was presented with an
ideal opportunity, in Unico v. Owens,74 to clarify the ambiguous state
of affairs surrounding the financier-dealer relationship in consumer
transactions. There the finance company was a partnership organized
expressly for the purpose of financing the dealer's sales. Following an
elaborate agreement between the financier and the retailer, all of the
retailer's consumer credit paper was discounted to that finance company.
In the particular instance at issue, the dealer entered into a "hyper-
executory" contract with the vendee, in which the consumer agreed
to purchase 140 stereo records and a stereo console, which were to be
71248 F. Supp. 364 (D. Oregon 1965).
72 82 N.J. Super. 438, 198 A.2d 98 (1954). It should be noted that this case, like
Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657, rehearing
denied 67 N.W.2d 873 (1955), involved a commercial transaction, as distin-
guished from a household sale.
73 See Westfield Investment Co. v. Fellers, 181 A.2d 809, 817 (N.J. Super. 1962).
74 232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967). The Negotiable Instruments Law was the governing
body of law in this case since the note was executed in November, 1962, and
the Uniform Commercial Code was not operative in New Jersey until January
1, 1963.
70 Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 161, 66 N.W.2d 657, 666
(1954).
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paid for in full within three years, with the understanding that 40 per-
cent of the records, although paid for would be delivered for another
2 1/3 years. The vendee executed a note and installment contract which
named the financier as the assignee-to-be. These forms furnished by the
financier were described by the court as containing conditions, waivers,
reservations and exceptions which were "skillfully devised to restrict
the liability of the seller within the narrowest limits, and to leave no
avenue of escape from liability on the part of the purchaser."7 5 There-
fore, this case is a prina facie example of the superior bargaining power
of the vendor and financier through the use of standardized forms, which
focus entirely on protecting the interests of the vendor and its intended
assignee. One principal factor stressed by the court was the tremendous
control that the financier exhibited over the whole underlying transac-
tion. The court, in fact, reiterated the holdings of preceding "close con-
nection" cases and New Jersey cases, and stated that the intimacy mani-
fested by this case far exceeded that present in those cases. Under these
circumstances the court held:
For purposes of consumer goods transactions, we hold that
where the seller's performance is executory in character and
when it appears from the totality of the arrangements between
the dealer and financier that the financier has had a substantial
voice in setting standards for the underlying transaction, or has
approved the standards established by the dealer, and has agreed
to take all or a predetermined or substantial quantity of the nego-
tiable paper which is backed by such standards, the financier
[sic] should be considered a participant in the original transaction
and therefore not entitled to holder in due course status.7 6
This position clearly is a judicial attempt to balance the interests of
the commercial community seeking unrestricted transferability of credit
paper against the interests of consumers, so as to enable consumers to
withhold payment in the event of a failure of consideration. In situations
which are fraught with the possibility of fraud, the judiciary has been
very careful not to permit the financier to utilize negotiable instruments
law to take unfair advantage of the vendee. However, these situations
are merely one extreme. At the other extreme there are financing situa-
tions where "good faith" is prevalent. Notwithstanding these latter
cases, the court in Unico has propounded a remedy which indiscrimi-
nately declares ordinary credit arrangements as per se disqualifications
to holder in due course status. This conclusion is unreasonably harsh in
light of the fact that, in order to avoid unnecessary delay and risk in
financing, some degree of participation by the financier is imperative."
Essentially, isn't the court saying that the financier shall bear the risk
of loss because it is better able to do so? Under this philosophy, just how
5 Id. at 408.
76 Id. at 417.
7 See note 67 supra.
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long will the financier bear the loss before passing its cost on to the bor-
rowing public?
Further problems arise as to exactly what are the relevant factors
distinguishing a "consumer goods transaction" from a commercial trans-
action. A far-reaching definition of the first type of transaction could
eventually lead to the extinction of holder in due course status in mer-
cantile as well as household transactions.
While the facts in the Unico case reek of a fraudulent scheme with
the purpose of obtaining defense-free credit paper, the standard enun-
ciated by the court goes beyond remedying this unscrupulous activity.
Even though the court at one point disregarded the polarity between the
good faith and "close connection" approaches, it ultimately disregards
any consideration of "good faith," and supercedes the Negotiable In-
struments Law with judicially-created criteria. As one commentator so
aptly stated, "the 'close connection' theory defeats the essential purpose
of the Negotiable Instruments Law by creating a hodge-podge of judi-
cial socio-economic policy superimposed on what is supposed to be a
law of national uniformity."781
Besides the injustice to the innocent financier inherent in this ra-
tionale, it will necessarily produce an increase of financing charges,
which, in turn, will limit the accessibility of financing to the general
public. Upon considering these ramifications, can it be said that the
Unico opinion attempts to weigh the policy consideration and take a
middle of the road approach? This is obviously not the case.
CONCLUSION
On the preceding pages of this article the author has endeavored to
illustrate the problems before a court deciding a consumer financing
case, the myriad of judicial solutions to remedy these problems, and
the ramifications resulting therefrom. Several commentators have
viewed the basic problem underlying these cases as emanating from
the misapplication of negotiable instruments law to consumer financing
cases.7 9 This approach is premised on the contention that the law of
negotiable instruments was promulgated to apply to transactions be-
tween merchants, where instruments such as bills of exchange and
warehouse receipts change hands frequently between strangers to the
original transaction thereby making it inappropriate to apply this law
to consumer financing, where the instruments are ear-marked for trans-
fer to a specific transferee. While this is certainly a feasible approach,
why cannot the reverse also be true? It might be that the consumer is
the one out of place. Regardless of which of these propositions is cor-
rect, the "handwriting is on the wall" that a legislative promulgation
treating the consumer transaction separately is a necessity. In fact,
several states have taken the initiative in passing legislation to deal
7s Note, 26 S. CAL. L. REv. 435, 437 n.23 (1953).
79 See Jones, supra note 4, at 184-185; Gilmore, supra note 30, at 1101.
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specifically with consumer problems.8 0 The drafters of the 1952 edition
of the Uniform Commercial Code attempted to take a compromising
stand by injecting into the "good faith" standard a requirement of com-
pliance with "the reasonable commercial standard of any business in
which the holder may be engaged.""" Under this standard the financier
could not look the other way when facts indicated the "employment of
doubtful business ethics" and still be permitted to assert holder in due
course status.8 2 Under the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code
the taking of a negotiable promissory note as payment of a debt arising
out of a consumer credit sale is prohibited; but if such a note is taken,
it may be enforced by a holder in due course according to its terms.8 3
While any legislation in this area will have as its primary goal the
protection of the consumer from unscrupulous practices by the con-
sumer, it cannot totally ignore the possible adverse affect on the free
flow of credit paper. Granted, that by shifting the risk of loss to the
financier the marketability of negotiable notes is not thwarted, because
the maker of that note is liable to a third party holder in due course
other than the financier. However, this proposition ignores the practical
consideration that in modern day business financial institutions are the
primary market for the mass of consumer paper, and, in the absence
of the availability of holder in due course status to financiers, the exis-
tence of the primary market is in jeopardy. Furthermore, the complete
denial of holder in due course status to financiers in consumer transac-
tions will inevitably reduce the size of this market, and lead to an in-
crease in financing charges, which in effect limits the accessibility of
this market to the general public. 8 4 In this light such a radical approach
is not in the best interests of the general public.
It is submitted that consumer financing should be viewed in terms
of a dilemma, and, therefore, any solution that merely considers one of
the alternatives only shifts the same problem into new surroundings.
As a result, it is of enormous importance that uniform legislation adopt-
ing a practical median between the two policy considerations be brought
forth in the near future. However, while the legislature is in search of
the Utopian solution, some courts, as is evident from Unico, will con-
tinue to castigate the financiers by arbitrarily cataloguing them as near-
partners in "close connection" cases. JEFFREY R. FULLER
80 For a discussion of these statutes see CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER LEGISLA-
TION 312-322 (1965).
81 See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201, 224
(1952) ; this requisite was deleted from the 1957 draft due to its adverse
effect to the certainty of negotiability.
82 For a discussion proposing the addition of the "reasonable commercial stand-
ards" requisite to the good faith standard, see Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase
of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CALIF. L. REv.
48 (1966).83 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.403.
84 See Note, 33 N.C. L. REv. 608, 611 n.13 (1955).
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